Maxims and sayings for
use in frames of reference on your case..
This page is being added to please revisit soon.?
A new section on Logic Law on aphorisms, rulings, and “Frames” of reference
in rebuttal of Sophistical Frames used against us.
Prepare your case and frame it in the context of principles from Caselaw, on
fairness, good faith, reasonableness, legitimate expectation and more.
Request: please help us build this database FOR YOU. The more we have, the better you're enabled to argue for yourselves.
See new section on clear fallacious logic and thinking in courts
and adjudicators, common features of
terms that stand in contradiction, 'contradictio in adiecto' that are perceived by way of immediate class inferences.
Also a section opening on 'legal authorities' in motoring regulations.
.....(a) Ultra Vires doctrine.
.....(b) The motoring public. Compliance with conditions attached to powers
.....(c) I do not think we are entitled to play fast and loose
.....(d) In notices affecting private rights,
.....(d) It is imperative that the public can have confidence
.....(e) Reasonable Expectations.
Some of the non-statutory controls are:
.....(b) Rules of natural justice, see just below.
.....(c) Proportionality (See Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. Union Territory, Chandigarh11, Union of India v. Rajesh P.U.12, etc.)
.....(d) Promissory estoppel
.....(e) Legitimate expectation
Rules of Natural Justice (top)
.....(a) Audi alteram partem.
.....(b) The rule against bias.
Additional arguments on
the rule against bias, are here, since increasingly
bias is being shown in British courts, especially where an
appellant is contesting decisions against local councils, who
have assumed the venal prerogative and purgative powers
of force where might is right; which it is most certainly
not, save by coincidence or sound reason.
Treason's his who's Might, denies good reason.” © Questor
.....(c) Unwritten rule of the law.
.....(a) The ultimate guardian of the fairness.
.....(b) The elements of a crime: Actus Reus and Mens Rea
.....(a) Negligence - Duty of care.
.....(b) The Caparo Test.
.....(c) 'contradictio in adiecto', contradiction in terms.
.....(d) Rulings in motoring cases.
Proportionality. (Quoting from ) (top)
.....(a) The Traffic Management and Parking Guidance for London issued by the Secretary of State in February 1998, para 4.5.
.....(b) Joint Report of the Parking Adjudicators of England and Wales for 2004:-
.....(c) The Chief Parking Adjudicator for England and Wales has recently referred to clamping as “draconian” and commented
Statutory controls are given in the statute (or rules or regulations made under the statute). Any executive action in violation of the same will be declared illegal by the courts, by applying the ultra vires doctrine.
(a) Ultra Vires doctrine. In administrative law, an act may be judicially reviewable ultra vires in a narrow or broad sense. Narrow ultra vires applies if an administrator did not have the substantive power to make a decision or it was wrought with procedural defects. Broad ultra vires applies if there is an abuse of power (e.g., Wednesbury unreasonableness or bad faith) or a failure to exercise an administrative discretion (e.g., acting at the behest of another or unlawfully applying a government policy). Either doctrine may entitle a claimant to various prerogative writs, equitable remedies or statutory orders if they are satisfied.
The motoring public deserves nothing less than that the public authorities exercising penal powers understand the importance of their complying with the conditions attached to their powers and are scrupulous about having in place administrative processes that do so. These sentiments apply to every stage of the enforcement process, not just the issue of a valid PCN. The Parking Adjudicators have had cause in their annual report on more than one occasion to comment on procedural irregularities that have come to their attention in appeals. “The Association of London Government Transport and Environment Committee 2002-2003 Chief adjudicator’s foreword”
'I do not think we are entitled to play fast and loose with statutory requirements designed to inform the subject as to his legal rights against an authority possessed of compulsory powers...........I do not think that prescriptions for the benefit of the subject are to be so disregarded. Lord Hailsham's judgment in London & Clydesdale:.
'In notices affecting private rights, particularly where the effect is penal, scrupulous observance of statutory conditions is normally required....An enforcement notice is void if it fails to state, as it should, the time allowed for compliance.' Wade & Forsyth: Administrative Law (8th Edn.) page 230.
It is up to local councils to ensure their PCNs are drafted in compliance with the Statute. These appeals show only too clearly that the findings and concerns of the Adjudicators over several years have been disregarded - - a most unattractive basis for asserting good administration. Moulder v Sutton LBC (PATAS Case No. 1940113243 24 May 1995) and in Royal Courts of Justice 2nd August 2006. Mr Justice Jackson.
It is imperative that the public can have confidence in the fairness and propriety of the enforcement of parking controls. It is also relevant that the penalties for parking contraventions are relatively low. It is very undesirable in those circumstances for the imposition of those penalties to be attended by uncertainties about its legality for procedural reasons. What is required is simplicity, clarity and certainty. London Borough of Wandsworth v Al's Bar & Restuarant Ltd
Reasonable expectations. Members of the public have a perfectly reasonable expectation from their local councils to uphold the law, and to do so with tolerance and understanding. Ignorance of the law for council's employing qualified legal practitioners is inexcusable. Scrupulous compliance is required especially when serving derogations on the motoring public, and even more when enforcements lead to increase in the penalties, and bailiff distraint. The growth of incentivised delivery of PCN,s, particularly those concerning trivial excess in contravention, has revealed an unequivocal disregard for professionally compliant documentation, concomitant with awareness of wilful omissions that are contrary to expressly stated mandates in statute. Such a code of conduct is reprehensible, and should render the offending party to liability for remedial reimbursement and damages. Leaving aside specific mention of a litany of cases where delivery of PCN's is not merely non compliant, but clearly intolerant, inhumane, unwarranted and fraudulent, in areas of enforcement where, among others, there is absence of proper signage, waiving any discretionary period of grace, waiving discretion used to enforce or cancel PCN's consistently, and where the motorist is deliberately kept in ignorance of the prevailing local 'traffic regulation orders', such that offences deemed to be contraventions may be quite the contrary.
Asymmetry of knowledge must be eschewed by the greater owner, and may not be used in abrogation of a duty of care in noblesse oblige, nor as an abuse of the inherent power advantaged and derivative of such asymmetries. It is the duty of a judicial controller or observer in any capacity, to avoid the choice of dereliction of duty in cloaked omissions, as a matter of self esteem and integrity, in making known any valid argument form, that acts as a bridle to such abuses, or indeed to merely adhere to the relevant Hippocratic oath for the professional function and capacity at the relevant time, rather than the Hippocritic oath to serve a hidden agenda. In such matters, Truth overrides Proof. Questor. © (top)
The Wednesbury Principle, A person entrusted with discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his attention to matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules he may truly be said to be acting unreasonably. Similarly, there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority.
Wednesbury unreasonableness is unreasonableness of an administrative decision that is so extreme that courts may intervene to correct it. The term derives from Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation  1 KB 223, where the court stated that it would not intervene to correct a bad administrative decision on grounds of its unreasonableness unless the decision was, as articulated in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service (the GCHQ case)  AC 374, 410 per Lord Diplock, "So outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it." ... Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation  1 KB 223
Rules of natural justice
(a) Audi alteram partem i.e. the person(s) to be affected by an order of the authority should be heard before the order is passed, This view of the House of Lords was followed by the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Dr. Binapani, and State of Maharashtra v. Jalgaon Municipal, wherein it was held that administrative orders which involve civil consequences have to be passed consistently with the rules of natural justice. The expression "civil consequences" means where rights and liabilities are affected. Thus, before blacklisting a person he must be given a hearing.
(b) The rule against bias. The principle that "no man should be a judge in his own cause" disqualifies an Administrator from giving a decision which affects the rights and liabilities, if he is biased. The requirement to give reasons in administrative decisions which affect rights and liabilities has been held to be mandatory by the Supreme Court in S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India. This reduces the chances of arbitrariness on the part of the authority, as the reasons recorded by him are subject to judicial scrutiny by the higher courts or authorities. (top)
It is an unwritten rule of the law, constitutional and administrative, that whenever a decision-making function is entrusted to the subjective satisfaction of a statutory functionary, there is an implicit obligation to apply his mind to pertinent and proximate matters only, eschewing the irrelevant and the remote.
“The ultimate guardian of the fairness of the proceedings was the trial judge who had been clearly apprised of the real difficulties which the absence of interpretation might create for the applicant. It further observes that the domestic courts have already taken the view that in circumstances such as those in the instant case, judges are required to treat an accused’s interest with“scrupulous care”. HOUSE OF LORDS European Union Committee 1st Report of Session 2004-05 Procedural Rights in Criminal Proceedings. 38 The judgment.
Doctrine of ultra vires: "ought to be reasonably, and not unreasonably, understood and applied, and that whatever may fairly be regarded as incidental to, or consequential upon, those things which the Legislature has authorized, ought not (unless expressly prohibited) to be held, by judicial construction, to be ultra vires." Lord Templeman, with whose speech the other members of the House agreed, also stated in the immediately preceding passage that section 111(1) embodies the principles relating to the powers of a company set out in Attorney General v Great Eastern Railway Co (1880) 5 App Cas 473. Lord Selborne LC said in that case, at p 478. Lord Blackburn said, at p 481: "where there is an Act of Parliament creating a corporation for a particular purpose, and giving it powers for that particular purpose, what it does not expressly or impliedly authorize is to be taken to be prohibited … those things which are incident to, and may reasonably and properly be done under the main purpose, though they may not be literally within it, would not be prohibited." (top)
The elements of a crime: Actus Reus and Mens Rea. As has been noted above in the case of dangerous driving, fault elements that do not require reference to the defendant’s state of mind are used. At common law this can be seen in the offence of killing by gross negligence. In R v Adomako  3 WLR288, Lord Mackay LC explained that liability would be established if the prosecution could prove that the defendant’s conduct departed from the proper standard of care incumbent upon him, thereby creating a risk of death, and involved such a departure from acceptable standards of care as to deserve the stigma of criminalisation. As was made clear in Attorney General’s Reference (No. 2 of 1999)  3 All ER 182, evidence of the defendant’s state of mind might be useful in guiding a jury as to whether or notthe negligence was gross, but this fault element can be made out without any direct evidence as to the defendant’s state of mind. Whilst this may seem to run counter to the trend in favour of subjectivity it should be remembered that it serves a useful social purpose in making it easier to impose criminal liability on companies that kill. In summary, therefore, it is undoubtedly true to say that mens rea does involve an examination of the defendant’s state of mind to ascertain a degree of awareness of the consequences of his actions. The law will, however, allow departures from this where the social utility and fairness of so doing is apparent.
Negligence - Duty of care. "The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be - persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question." .....Donoghue v Stevenson  AC 562, Lord Atkin attempted to lay down a general principle which would cover all the circumstances where the courts had already held that there could be liability for negligence.
Lord Wilberforce accepts what might be seen as the high point of the adoption of the statements of Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson. He says: - ‘Through the trilogy of cases in this House, Donoghue v Stevenson, Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller v Partners Ltd and Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd, the position has now been reached that in order to establish that a duty of care arises in a particular situation, it is not necessary to bring the facts of that situation within those of previous situations in which a duty of care has been held to exist. Rather the question has to be approached in two stages. First one has to ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage there is a sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to the latter, in which case a prima facie duty of care arises. Secondly, if the first question is answered affirmatively, it is necessary to consider whether there are any considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is owed or the damages to which a breach of it may give rise’.
The three-stage 'Caparo' test required:
Data provided in a letter to Cllr. Mrs. Dawn Somper from Mr. R. Bright, Parking Manager, 15/2/05.
“…each authority should consider which offences might result in vehicles being clamped or removed as part of its enforcement strategy. For example, clamping and removal might be reserved for persistent contravention, safety reasons, relieving congestion, removing obstruction of crossovers, controlling parking generated by special events, controlling parking during busy seasonal shopping periods, and deterring commuter parking”.
“It is important therefore that the decision to clamp a vehicle or to tow it away is made with care and only in circumstances in which the Council seriously believes that its decision can be justified if challenged by the motorist”
“Adjudicators are of the view that the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into the national legislation places a greater duty on councils to have regard to proportionality. In particular, the decision to remove a vehicle must be taken in the context of Article One of the First Protocol of the ECHR and requires the exercise of judgment. It is for the council to prove that the removal was proportionate and necessary. They need to be able to justify in every case why the issue of a PCN alone would not have achieved the desired objective (i.e. of a reasonable level of compliance with legitimate parking restrictions”.
Proportionality is regarded as a fundamental principle of European law and was established by the European Court of Justice in the case Fromancais SA v Fonds d'Orientation et de Regularisation – 1983 where the Court ruled:
“ In order to establish whether a provision of Community Law is consonant with the principle of proportionality it is necessary to establish in the first place, whether the means it employs to achieve its aim correspond to the importance of the aim.
English equivalence. At http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/EUECJ/1983/R6682.html
'contradictio in adiecto',
Contradiction in terms.
Whoever quotes alone the terms “Justice must be seen to be done” is playing dangerously with semantics[ in an utterly unacceptable manner; that lends force to the persuasion that “seeing may be subjectively false in correspondence theory”. in the same way as I have seen a respondent from Oxford Council argue in a court exchange, that they served a Penalty Charge Notice (PCN), Charge Certificate, (CC) and Notice to Owner (NTO), when it was alleged they served ILLEGAL documents; ie 'purporters' each of, Penalty Charge Notice (PCN), Charge Certificate, (CC) and Notice to Owner (NTO).
ambiguity and blur here is simple. Maintain an outward
appearance of truth by reducing the concept of a 'genus et
differentia' , to the next higher level of differentia or even
to the root level of genus. IE; SUBTRACT the essential
qualifying adjective or adverb. Swearing the economic truth
they served each 'purporter' simply as the genus, without the
term 'legal' is a swearing of truth that materially implies the
falsity when regarded against the allegation itself, and this
sleight of hand (writing), is often unnoticed or willfully
ignored by a judge.
Seen to be Done: The Principle of Open Justice
KEYNOTE ADDRESS TO THE 31ST AUSTRALIAN LEGAL
CONVENTION CANBERRA 9 OCTOBER 1999
All lawyers will
recognise the oft cited aphorism of Lord Hewart from Rex v
Sussex Justices; Ex parte McCarthy:
“… Judges, like Caesar’s
wife, should be above suspicion …”. 3
The Principle of Open Justice
MacLeod v Hamilton 1965 S.L.T 305
If signs to indicate the effect of a "No Waiting" order have not been erected, or signs have been erected not conforming to s.64 of the RTRA 1984 and TSRGD 2002 (SI 2002/3113), no offence against the "No Waiting" order is committed.
Hassan v DPP  R.T.R. 209, Divisional Court
The absence of a sign specifying the prescribed hours of restricted parking in a road marked with a single yellow line is fatal to a successful prosecution for a no waiting offence.
Davies v Heatley  R.T.R 145
Because by s.64(2) of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 traffic signs shall be of the size, colour and type prescribed by regulation, if a sign the contravention of which is an offence contrary to s.36 is not as prescribed by the regulation, no offence is committed if the sign is contravened, even if the sign is clearly recognisable to a reasonable man as a sign of that kind. (top)
Judicial Review (indeed any kind of review that is fair.)
There is acceptance by Parliament and the executive that the courts - The Administrative Court of the High Court - can review a range of executive powers and this includes delegated legislation. Other laws and purported decisions of public authorities are also reviewable.
The rules of natural justice are a key feature in judicial review proceedings, and have been developed by the judges as part of the common law and where one or both have not been complied with, the aggrieved person may seek judicial review under Part 54 The Civil Procedure Rules 1998. The relief granted will be an order
a) a mandatory order;
b) a prohibiting order;
c) a quashing order; or
d) an injunction under section 30 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (restraining a person from acting in any office in which he is not entitled to act).
The overriding objective of the Civil Procedure rules is to enable the court to “deal with cases justly”.
The courts and the executive met head on in M v Home Office . M was to be deported and sought judicial review of the Home Office decision. The Home Secretary’s counsel gave the court an undertaking that this would not happen until after the hearing of the appeal. However, M was deported. The court ordered that M should be taken off the plane when it stopped at Paris. The Home Secretary did not consider himself bound by the order and M was not taken off the plane. The Home Secretary was held in contempt of court but no punishment imposed. The "rule of law" requires even government ministers to accept and obey the orders of the courts. M disappeared shortly after he arrived in Zaire and has never been heard from again.
In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Hickey & Others (1994) (See the Bridgewater 4 above) it was held that when the Home Secretary received a petition from someone wishing to have his case referred back to the Court of Appeal under s 17 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 and the Home Secretary made enquiries and obtained fresh evidence, he was required in fairness to disclose this to the petitioner. Judicial review was granted to the applicants who included the ‘Bridgewater Three’.
Natural justice (procedural propriety)
Natural justice simply means to act fairly. Natural Justice has little to do with the philosophy of Natural Law; simply it is an appeal to fairness, justice, during judicial review proceedings.
Re HK (an infant) (1967) introduced the phrase “act fairly”; it was established that all decision makers must act fairly.
In Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment (1981), Lord Diplock stated that, “the only requirement ... as to the procedure to be followed at a local inquiry ... is that it must be fair to all those who have an interest in the decision that will follow it”.
In Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (1985) (the GCHQ spy case) Lord Roskill said that natural justice might now be laid to rest and be ‘replaced ... by a duty to act fairly’. Lord Scarman spoke of ‘the requirement of natural justice namely the duty to act fairly’ and observed that this applies to purely administrative acts.
Some courts talk of the "rules" of natural justice, as opposed to a general duty to act fairly and so it is not settled whether these are still separate. However, what is clear is that the courts are not concerned with the merits of a claim and will not substitute its decision for that of the decision-maker. Usually cases are sent back to the decision-maker who will be required to make a new decision in accordance with the recommendations of the court as to the extent of its legal powers. Thus, the reference to a duty to act fairly relates to process and not to the merits of a decision.
The "rules of natural justice"
Trials and hearings must be fair, and there are two parts,
The right to be heard audi alteram partem
The right to be heard does not necessarily offer a right to legal representation. A person should be given adequate prior notice of charges or allegations and a reasonable opportunity to put his or her case.
In some cases, this includes the right to call witness, to cross-examine and the right to be given reasons for decision. These rights can be Statute or Common Law based.
R v Bern and Clinche (1798) Defence must be heard must and he must know of the case against him, and he must be allowed to state his case.
Both sides should have a fair hearing.
In Bradford v McLeod  HCJ (Scotland) a magistrate was heard on a social occasion saying that striking miners should not be given legal aid, a miner was later acquitted because the comments gave the impression of bias.
In R v Gough  HL a juror was a neighbour of the brother of the defendant, this gave only the appearance of bias, but as D had received a fair trial, he had been rightly convicted.
There must be a reasonable opportunity to test evidence.
In R v Thames Magistrates' Court ex parte Polemis  QBD a Greek see captain not given time to prepare his defence to an allegation of polluting docks with oil, he received his summons at 10.30 am the case being heard at 4pm.
In Chief Constable of North Wales v Evans  HL the Chief Constable dismissed a probationary constable on the basis of erroneous rumours that he had been a “Hippy” had several dogs, and financial difficulties, none was true, and the PC was not given the opportunity to refute them.
In R v Leicester JJ ex p Barrow  CA in order to give advice an assistance a “McKenzie Friend” was asked to be allowed to sit with the defendants in a “poll-tax case”, the magistrates refused, they should not have done so.
In Ridge v Baldwin (1964) HL the watch committee sacked Ridge the chief constable of Brighton after he had been acquitted on charges relating to corruption. On appeal, he won because Police Regulations had set down a procedure that should be followed also because there was a lack of natural justice; he had neither been told of the reasons for dismissal nor given the opportunity to put his case to the watch committee.
In Glynn v Keele University (1972) QBD a student was seen sunbathing nude but he was not given a hearing at all, instead he was sent a letter fining him £10 and was suspended. Although the student had not suffered any injustice, he should have been given the opportunity to test the evidence.
Curing unfair decisions
Judicial Review does not substitute a new decision; a new hearing is required to “cure” the unfair one. The review will not question the decision just the procedure, in this respect Glynn v Keele is probably a rogue decision as it sought to deal with the decision and not what it should, and that was to correct the procedure.
The rule against bias - nemo judex in res sua
Lord Denning in Metropolitan Properties Ltd v Lannon  CA said,
“The reason is plain enough. Justice must be rooted in confidence: and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking: 'The judge was biased'.“
The rule against bias requires that judges and decision maker leaves aside prejudices which was not demonstrated by the magistrate in R v Bingham Justices ex p Jowitt (1974) QBD where a magistrate hearing a speeding case said “My principle in such cases has always been to believe the evidence of the police officer."
The test of apparent bias has been developed through a succession of cases. In R v Barnsley Licensing Justices, Ex p Barnsley and District Licensed Victuallers' Association , Devlin LJ recognised that
"Bias is or may be an unconscious thing and a man may honestly say that he was not actually biased and did not allow his interest to affect his mind, although, nevertheless, he may have allowed it unconsciously to do so".
Lord Denning MR, in Metropolitan Properties Co (FGC) Ltd v Lannon  said:
"The court looks at the impression which would be given to other people. Even if he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless if right-minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit. And if he does sit, his decision cannot stand . . . "
Where a decision-maker has an interest with a party or witness he should stand down. Lord Hoffman should have done just that in Re: Pinochet  HL, because he had a former interest in Amnesty International, that he should have disclosed because the case involved exactly the type of activity that Amnesty was engaged in preventing.
Where there is a pecuniary interest, the law automatically assumes bias
The rules of natural justice require that the judge has no interest in the outcome. Judges, magistrates and juries must not be biased, in Dimes v Grand Junction Canal (1852) HL the judge Vice Chancellor Cottenham held shares in the canal, which was a party to the proceedings, and was therefore biased.
Real likelihood of bias
In R v Sussex Justices Ex parte McCarthy (1924) KBD a magistrates’ clerk was acting in civil proceedings following a road accident when the other party appeared before the magistrates on a dangerous driving charge relating to the same incident. It was this case where the famous phrase “it [… ] is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.” was used in an extempore judgement by Lord Hewart.
During an adjournment of the inquest concerning the sinking of "The Marchioness", the coroner was reported as describing some of the relatives of the deceased as "unhinged" and "mentally unwell" which indicated a real possibility of unconscious bias. A new coroner was order to resume the decision making process R v Inner West London Coroner ex parte Dallaglio (1994) “The Marchioness”.
Lord Goff of Chieveley, in R v Gough , formulated the test of apparent bias in terms a little different from those now accepted, but echoed (at p 659) Devlin LJ's observation in the Barnsley Licensing Justices case in referring to
"the simple fact that bias is such an insidious thing that, even though a person may in good faith believe that he was acting impartially, his mind may unconsciously be affected by bias . . .".
Following the decision of the Court of Appeal in In re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No 2) , the accepted test is that laid down in Porter v Magill  HL, para 103:
"whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased".
Legitimate expectation may arise out of a promise or a regular practice. Expectations include being consulted, the right to a hearing and to make representations. Legitimate expectation only concerns procedural requirements and not substantive ones.
It has been available from 1969 but was not developed unit the 1980’s. Basically, it requires that a public body should keep its promises.
1. Express promise given by decision maker should be honoured
2. Regular past practice reasonably expected to continue should be allowed to continue.
In Schmidt v Secretary of State for Home Affairs  CA where an immigrant had been refused entry to the UK on the grounds that he belonged to the Scientology movement, Lord Denning (obiter) introduced principle of legitimate expectation. Schmidt was followed in R v Liverpool Corporation ex parte Liverpool Taxi Operators Association (1972) QBD where the corporation did not consult the LTOA despite having agreed that they would consult them before they issued more licences. Schmidt was followed again in Attorney General of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu (1983) PC it had been announced that before repatriation illegal immigrants (from Macau (now part of China) to Hong Kong) would be interviewed and cases “treated on its merits” in this case it did not happen. Ng was deported without any opportunity of giving his reasons for remaining in Hong Kong. It was held that the undertaking gave rise to a “legitimate expectation” that his case would be considered on its merits.
However, not until Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for Civil Service (1985) HL “The GCHQ spy case” was this third head added by Lord Diplock. He said we should use the term “procedural propriety”. The GCHQ case involved a ban on workers joining a trade union; the ban was issued by the head of the civil service by way of an Order in Council. The House of Lords held that the employees had a legitimate expectation to be consulted before such action was taken.
In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Khan (1985) CA K and his wife wished to adopt a child from Pakistan. K obtained from a Citizens’ Advice Bureau a standard letter from the Secretary of State stating that he “may exercise his discretion and exceptionally allow a child to be brought here for adoption” when satisfied on four specified matters. K’s application was refused and it was shown that the Secretary of State took into account a matter not mentioned in his letter. The court held that any change in policy should have resulted in a hearing at which K could have made representations. The Secretary of State was under a duty to act fairly and was obliged to reconsider the matter on the basis of his letter, or if the new policy was to apply, K should have an opportunity of being heard.
Natural Justice having started life as a very narrow doctrine with two heads, developed into three. Today, judges use it regularly to mean any procedure that is fair. So it is now is a very broad approach. Some judges talk about the “requirements of natural justice and fairness” and do not attempt to distinguish them.